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INTRODUCTION

During the 1980s a handful of state judges either held or opined
in dicta what must be uncontrovertible to the feminist community, as
well as to most progressive legal advocates and academics: the so-called
marital rape exemption, whether statutory or common law in origin,
constitutes a denial of a married woman's constitutional right to equal
protection under the law.1 Indeed, a more obvious denial of equal
protection is difficult to imagine: the marital rape exemption denies
married women protection against violent crime solely on the basis of
gender and marital status. What possibly could be less rational than
a statute that criminalizes sexual assault, and punishes it severely,
unless the victim and assailant are married? What could be more
obvious than the plain fact, repeatedly documented, that these state
laws are derived from a sorry history of discriminatory, misogynist,

*Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979, University of
Maryland (Baltimore); J.S.M. 1982, Stanford University.
1. See, e.g., Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Williams v.
State, 494 So. 2d 819, 830 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d
567, 573-76, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213-16 (1984); People v. DeStefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 163-64,
170,467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 515-16 (County Ct. 1983); Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1987).
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and hateful denials of a married woman's legal right to equal dignity
and respect? Where could one possibly find a sharper example of a
state law that explicitly insulates and protects a separate political
system of subordination and violence against a group of citizens, and
thereby denies those citizens protection of the laws given others? So
why has not the Supreme Court held as much?
Indeed, that a number of feminist commentators 2 and a few state
court appellate judges 3 felt it necessary to argue to a still skeptical
and often hostile listening audience that marital rape exemptions constitute a denial of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee that no state
4
shall deny to any group of its citizens equal protection of its law
evidences the degree to which women's injuries still are trivialized
and rendered invisible by a pervasively misogynist legal, political, and
social culture. That the arguments of these advocates met with such
limited success in abolishing the exemption reveals how short a distance women have come, and how far we have yet to travel, toward
full equality and the necessary result of equality: an assurance that
the state will provide a modicum of safety in our private lives against
sexual assault.
Some states did make limited progress in reforming marital rape
law during the 1980s. A few abolished the exemption entirely5 - but
only a few. The majority continue to permit rape or sexual assault
within marriage by according it a lower level of criminality than extramarital rape of sexual assault, by criminalizing only certain kinds
of marital rape, or by criminalizing only first-degree rapes. 6 Some

2. See Freeman, But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who(m) Can You Rape?: The Marital
Rape Exemption Re-Examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 29 (1981); Note, To Have and To Hold: The
Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986)
[hereinafter NOte, To Have and To Hold]; Note, 24 J. FAm. L. 87, 87-93 (1985); Comment,
For Better or for Worse: Marital Rape, 15 N. Ky. L. REV. 611, 631-34 (1988).
3. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 163-64, 170, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573-76, 485
N.Y.S.2d 207, 213-16 (1984) (opinion by Judge Wachtler advancing the most complete argument).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. For examples of judicial abolishment of the marital rape exemption, see supra note 1.
For examples of legislative abolishment of the exemption, see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.443
(repealed 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1989); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 251 (1983 & Supp. 1989); id. § 252 (repealed 1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-319 to -320 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-01 to -03 (1985 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.355-.375 (1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1989).
6. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 (1989) (criminalizing sexual assault of
a spouse); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1988) (no arrest or prosecution unless spouse uses
force or threat and violation is reported within 90 days, full exemption for lower degrees);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(b) (West 1985) (first degree rape only); HAw. REV. STAT.
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states, ironically in the name of reform, may have worsened the problem of marital rape by extending the exemption to include women
who rape their husbands in order to make the exemptions appear
"gender neutral. ''1 This extension provides a false neutrality to an
institution that almost invariably endangers only women's lives s Other
states have limited the exemption to exclude married partners who
live apart 9 and, in a few cases, married partners who have begun

§ 707-730-732 (Supp. 1989) (first through third degrees only); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Supp.
1989) (only if force or threat of immediate bodily harm); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-18(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1989) (rape must be reported within 80 days; criminal action only allowed if force
used); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.2-.4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989) (first and second degree only);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3501.02, .17, .18 (1983) (husband can be charged with rape, but not
sexual battery or aggravated sexual battery); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 27-464D (Repl.
vol. 1987 & Supp. 1989) (husband can be charged with rape only if force used); MICH. CoDIP.
LAws ANN. § 750.5201 (West Supp. 1989) (no crime for lesser degrees); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.349 (West 1987) (no crime for lesser degrees); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503 (1989)
(husbands and cohabitants cannot be charged with sexual assault, can be charged with rape);
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.373 (Michie Supp. 1989) (crime of "sexual assault of spouse"
available only if force or threat present); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 (1986 & Supp.
1989) (no crime for lesser degrees); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (no
crime for lesser degrees); id. § 3126-27 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1-6 (1989)
(husband cannot be charged with first degree rape; no crime for lesser degrees); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1.1 (1988) (spouse cannot be charged with rape unless spouses are no longer
cohabitating or are legally separated, spouse uses force, and complaint is made within 90 days
of the occurrence); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21-02(a), -12 (Vernon 1989) (husbands can be
charged with only "aggravated sexual assault"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (1988) (10-day reporting requirement; spouse can be charged only with first and second degree rape); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-8B-6 (1989) (first degree rape only; lesser penalty than nonmarital rape); Wyo. STAT. §
6-2-307 (1989) (first and second degree only).
7. Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1.1 (1988) (recognizing spousal rape).
8. See Note, supra note 2, at 1270-72.
9. See, e.g., *Ky.REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1989) (action only if petition filed
for separation or divorce and parties living apart); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.41 (West 1986)
(spouse cannot be charged unless parties living apart and offender knows that a temporary
restraining order or injunction has been issued); MD.CRIM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 27-464D (Repl.
vol. 1989 & Supp. 1989) (if living together, actual force, rather than threat of force, required);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (Supp. 1989) (spouse cannot be charged for sexual battery unless
parties living apart; statute silent on rape); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010.2 (Vernon Supp. 1989)
(husband cannot be charged unless parties living apart, pursuant to legal separation or living
apart where wife has received restraining order); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (1989) (husbands
can be charged for rape, but not sexual assault unless parties living apart); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-10 to -11 (1984) (spouse cannot be charged unless couple is living apart or either spouse
has filed for divorce); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (Supp. 1990) (spouse cannot be charged
unless couple living apart petition for separation or divorce is pending or granted, and force is
used); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (spouse cannot be charged unless couple
living apart by court order); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1.1 (1988) (husband cannot
be charged unless couple living apart); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-610 (1982) (spouse cannot be
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dissolution proceedings. 1° These restrictions on the exemption, however, are a mixed blessing. While the restrictions undoubtedly limit
the application of the exemption, they further entrench the core
rationale of the exemption: the protection of the privacy and integrity
of the true marital relationship against legal intervention justifies
whatever burden forced sex imposes on a married woman's safety and
privacy. Furthermore, movements in other states to extend the marital
rape exemption offset these limits. For example, some states have
extended the marital rape exemption to include cohabitants and formerly married persons.,,
This pattern of one-step-forward, two-steps-back progress on the
criminalization of marital rape illustrates the general pattern of thinking in the 1980s regarding marital rape. While virtually every progressive commentator, judge, or legislator (feminist and otherwise) who
seriously has considered the issue readily has concluded that these
laws violate equal protection, 12 and while explicit vocal support from
conservatives for the exemption almost entirely has disappeared from
scholarly literature, 13 no major upheaval of the law reflects or
foreshadows such progressive unanimity. No congressional action, or
any Supreme Court analogue to Brown v. Board of Education,14 has
enshrined in the country's fundamental law the political judgment that
"equal protection of the law" minimally guarantees an equal protection
from the states' criminal codes and enforcement agencies against violent sexual assault, regardless of marital status. In other words, no
fundamental legal reform exists to bring these laws into line with
what is perceived by commentators to be a constitutional mandate.
Thus, the change in social consciousness that often follows constitutionally mandated legal reform has not come to fruition. Those who under-

charged unless couple living apart and one spouse has filed for separation or divorce); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (1989) (spouse cannot be charged unless couple living apart by court
order).
10. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1989) (action only if separated or filing for divorce).
11. Many states include cohabitants within the scope of the marital rape exemption. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(b) (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10 (1989); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon 1983).
12. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
13. But see Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 31, 43-44
(1980) (limited spousal immunity supports marital privacy rights and encourages reconciliations);
Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Explorationof the Operation and Objectives of the
Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 74 (1952) (policy of protecting reliance on behavior of
others should prevail over the demand for protection of the woman's right to withhold consent).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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stand the exemption view it as an antiquated holdover from an earlier
and discarded view of women. 15 But the educated public, and even
the legal community, lacks general awareness that these laws not only
inflict extensive damage on innumerable women's lives, but also constitute a constitutional outrage.
Later in this essay, 16 I briefly will summarize and endorse the
conclusion of the feminist writers and progressive courts that have
considered the issue: the marital rape exemption unconstitutionally
denies married women fourteenth amendment equal protection
rights.'7 That argument, however, is not the central concern of this
paper. For the most part, I will assume, rather than argue, that a
state's refusal to protect married women against violent sexual assault
is unconstitutional. Instead, I want to use the marital rape laws and
the movements directed toward their reform to raise two related issues
about equal protection ideology and equality theory. The first issue
is theoretical; the second is strategic.
The theoretical issue is the following: Why is it that this overwhelmingly obvious constitutional flaw in our criminal law has not, in the
last ten years, attracted more attention, generated more outrage, and
simply collapsed of its own unconstitutional weight? Why, after several
decades of case law and academic commentary on the meaning, original
intent, and political vision embodied in the equal protection guarantee
of the fourteenth amendment, do we still have marital rape exemptions, the express purpose of which is to deprive married women of
the state's protection against rape? My argument will be that the
endurance of marital rape exemptions, despite their apparent unconstitutionality, 8 partly results from the dominant understanding of the
meaning of equality and constitutionally guaranteed equal protection.
This understanding, particularly as elaborated by the present Supreme
Court, obfuscates the unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions.
No matter how unequal the laws are, given the current state of equal
protection doctrine, no obvious, compelling argument sustains the conclusion that they are unconstitutional. Consequently, although an
emerging consensus indicates that these laws surely must be unconstitutional, no widely agreed-upon argument sustains that conclusion.

15. See, e.g., Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 2, at 1270.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
17. For the argument in detail, see Note, To Have and To Hold, supranote 2, at 1267-72.
18. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-54 (1972) (by providing dissimilar treatment
for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, contraception statute violated

the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
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The difficulty in presenting a case that demonstrates the blatant unconstitutionality of these laws, however, does not suggest that they
are constitutional. Rather, it illustrates the inadequacies and ambiguities in the equality theory within which equal protection arguments must be framed. [n other words, the endurance of marital rape
exemptions partly is a function of the inadequacy of the dominant or
mainstream political theory of equality, which informs dominant legal
understandings of the constitutional mandate of equal protection. 19
This much of the argument should not be surprising or unfamiliar
to a feminist audience; feminist and progressive discontent with traditional equality theory and equal protection law reached an all-time
high in the 1980s. ° The endurance of marital rape exemptions simply
illustrates the inadequacies in modern equal protection law alleged by
feminists and progressives over the last decade. More specifically,
however, and perhaps more controversially, I will argue that the inadequate theories of equality and equal protection that we have inherited and that have muted the force of constitutional challenges to
the marital rape exemption are not solely the product of the bad faith,
sexist, racist, classist, or conservative politics of the Supreme Court
Justices who authored those doctrines. They also are a product of the
adjudicative institutional context in which those theories have evolved.
Mainstream views on the meaning of equality and equal protection
respond not only to political biases, but also to the institutional constraints of their judicial origins. The Supreme Court, and therefore
the rest of us, including the feminist community, generally have
examined, developed, and debated the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection guarantee in the particular context of
judicial challenges to state classifications. This adjudicative context,
I believe, has skewed and limited our understanding of equal protection
and our understanding of how we should make the promise of equal
protection a reality. More specifically, our confinement to the judicial
forum has truncated a wide range of potential constitutional claims,
including the particular claim that marital rape exemptions violate the
fourteenth amendment.
This paper proposes not so much a novel approach to marital rape
exemption or to the fourteenth amendment, but rather a new direction
of progressive and feminist-informed constitutional arguments. I will
urge that we should direct our arguments away from a hypothetical

19. See infra text accompanying notes 69-93.
20. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
(1989); Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 201.
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judicial audience and toward a congressional audience. If the dominant
understandings of equal protection truly are inadequate, and if judicially developed law has determined the content of those inadequate
understandings, then "equal protection" might take on a very different
and more helpful meaning if developed in a congressional, rather than
a judicial, context. That very different meaning might highlight, rather
than obfuscate, the unconstitutionality of the marital rape exemptions.
Congress might respond more aggressively than the Court to the
unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions, not only because of
the different political compositions of the Court and Congress, but
also because equal protection as a political principle guiding Congress
might carry a broader meaning than does equal protection as a.legal
principle binding the Court.
Part IIof this essay discusses three contrasting understandings of
the meaning of equal protection: the Supreme Court's dominant rationality approach; Professor MacKinon's proposed dissident "antisubordination" approach; and what I label the '"pure protection" understanding, which may be closest to the original meaning of the clause.21 Part
III of this essay will then re-examine the constitutionality of marital
rape exemptions in light of these competing views of the meaning of
equal protection.-2 The essay will posit that even if we accept the
traditional, "rationality" model of equal protection, marital rape
exemptions are unconstitutional. The arguments, however, are relatively weak because of the content of the rationality model itself.
Alternatively, if we understand equal protection in either the antisubordinationist sense (that no state shall participate in the social subordination of one group by another) or in the historical protectionist
sense (that no state shall deny to any group of citizens the protection
of its police power against criminal assault) then marital rape exemptions clearly are unconstitutional. Judicial adherence to the rationality
model of equal protection, consequently, obfuscates this unconstitutionality and obstructs, or at least impedes, the abolition of these
harmful exemptions.
Part IV of this essay demonstrates that the dominant but inadequate rationality view of equality is largely a product of the adjudicative context in which that theory arose. 3 In spite of the Supreme
Court's rejection of them over the last few decades, the antisubordinationist and protectionist equal protection theories, from time to

21.
22.
23.

See infra text accompanying notes 27-67.
See infra text accompanying notes 69-93.
See infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
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time, have been understood as the primary meaning of the clause.
However, their collective mandate that no state shall perpetuate, encourage, or insulate the social subordination of one group of citizens
by another by withholding from the subordinated group the protection
of its law historically has been met through congressional, rather than
judicial, action.- Part V of this essay urges feminists, over the next
decade, not only to continue to press the Court to rule against these
laws on the basis of their irrationality, but also to urge Congress to
respond to the mandate of section five of the fourteenth amendment
by undertaking consideration of a "Married Women's Privacy Act."The purpose of the Act would be to guarantee all women the full
protection of the states' laws against criminal assault.
II.

THREE THEORIES OF EQUALITY

A.

The Rationality Model

The dominant judicial interpretation of the equal protection clause
is that the clause generally seeks to ensure that legislators govern in
a fair-handed and well-motivated way, rather than out of a malicious
desire to hurt some groups or a biased desire to help others.2 Of
course, all legislation unavoidably burdens some groups while helping
others, but the Constitution requires the legislative allocation of those
burdens and benefits to be directed toward legitimate governmental
ends. Accordingly, legislation must be rational, or evenhanded: legislation must not be the -product of bias, malice, or differing levels of
concern for some citizens over others. Rather, legislation and the
classifications of legislation must be rationally related to legitimate
state ends. In accord with general usage, I call this dominant view
the rationality model of equal protection.2

24.

Examples include the Civil Rights Act of 1875, partially struck in The Civil Rights

Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a to 2000h-5
(West 1982), upheld in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
25. See infra text accompanying note 105.
26. For a general discussion, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-13
to -17, at 1465-88 (1988).
27. For general discussions of the rationality approach to equal protection, see J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 145-48 (1980); Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-24

(1972); Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979); Sunstein, Naked Preferencesand the Constitution,84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1689, 1697-98, 1713-14 (1984); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 537, 569-77 (1982).
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The rationality model, as it has developed doctrinally, imposes
three easily summarized constraints upon legislative classifications.2
First, as the name of the model implies, legislative classifications must
be rational: "like groups must be treated alike." Thus, a legislative
classification that defines groups A and B, divides them, and then
treats them differently must "map on to" or "mirror" a distinction in
the world between groups A and B that is relevant to some legitimate
state objective. If no relevant difference between groups A and B
exists, then legislation that treats them differently is irrational and
unconstitutional because it denies the citizens in the burdened group
equal protection of the laws. For example, if a statute prohibits minors
under the age of sixteen from applying for driver's licenses, some
"real world" difference must exist between those under and over sixteen that correlates with some legitimate state objective. In other
words, some correlation must exist between maturity and propensity
to drive safely. If no such correlation exists, evidence of the irrational
desire to burden young teenagers must have motivated the legislators
rather than by a legitimate governmental aim. Because most of us
generally accept the notion of a correlation between maturity and
driving ability, the cut-off age seems to be constitutionally unassailable, at least on rationality grounds.
The rationality model imposes a second constraint on classification.
The legislative classification must be relevant to a legitimate end. If
the classification furthers a legitimate state objective only marginally
or not at all and imposes a significant cost on the burdened class, then
the legislation might be unconstitutional. Applying this requirement
to the driving statute and assuming that age correlates with driving
ability, the exclusion of those under sixteen from the driving population
must further sufficiently the legitimate goal of driving safety in order
to justify the burden placed on teenagers - the lack of mobility.
Again, because most people would feel fairly confident that the exclusion does improve driving safety and because we are not terribly
concerned about obstacles to teenage mobility, the driving statute
passes the relevance requirement just as it did the rationality requirement.
Finally, the rationality model requires that the articulated legislative end be a legitimate one. Legislators may classify and differentially
assist or burden certain groups, but only if they are doing so in the
public interest or toward the vindication of some public value.

28. For a detailed discussion of these constraints, see L.
-6, at 1438-54.
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Moreover, the end toward which the classification is directed must be
an end that legislators are permitted to pursue. Legislators may not
classify for the malicious satisfaction of hurting one sector of the community while helping another. The driving statute survives this final
test, for public safety surely is a legitimate legislative end. The statute,
therefore, is not aimed at maliciously burdening young teenagers.
These three basic principles of rationality, relevance, and legitimacy provide the foundation for modern equal protection jurisprudence. These three constraints motivated the Court to adopt various
levels of "scrutiny" for different types of legislation. The rationality,
relevance, and legitimacy requirements also explain the peculiarities
of Supreme Court doctrine regarding legislation that classifies on the
basis of genders and the "intent" requirement that facially neutral
legislation that adversely impacts upon a particular group must meet.3
A brief summary of these three doctrinal areas reveals the Court's
general commitment to rationality.
First, the logic of the Court's two-tiered, or heightened versus
low-level, review more or less follows directly from rationality principles. Under the rationality, relevance, and legitimacy principles summarized above, the Court has conceded that most economic or social
legislation is presumptively rational, relevant to legitimate governmental ends, and, hence, constitutional.31 After all, relevance, rationality,
and legitimacy, are all relative qualities, and the Court has developed
a pattern of general deference to legislative judgment in the economic
and social spheres. Classifications that involve race, however, are
entirely another matter. The Court generally has held that most racially explicit classifications are presumptively suspect, and, therefore,
their rationality, their relevance, and their legitimacy must be strictly
scrutinized. 32 Such strict scrutiny typically has resulted in the invalidation of these statutes.s Racial classifications presumptively fail to
29. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
30. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (statute must have a racially discriminatory purpose to violate equal protection clause).
31. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (several provisions of
state statute governing opticians were rationally related to legitimate governmental ends and
did not violate equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment).
32. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 720-23 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (searching judicial inquiry required to determine whether racial classifications are suspect or benign); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (racial and ethnic
distinctions are inherently suspect and require "exacting judicial examination"); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
33. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1967) (strict scrutiny applied to determine
that interracial marriage proscription statute constituted invidious racial discrimination). But
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mirror a real distinction in the world between the classes they
categorize and presumptively fail to further legitimate governmental
ends. Hence, blacks and whites possess no inherent real differences,
and the Court finds irrational legislative classifications that create
differences between blacks and whites. Further, such classifications,
whether rational or not, are relevant to no legitimate ends.m Thus,
the Court routinely engages in a heavy presumption that racial classifications are not good-faith attempts to classify based on real world
differences that are relevant to legitimate goals. Rather, the Court
views these classifications as badly motivated attempts to burden already disadvantaged subordinate groups.
The Court seems to believe that gender classifications fall somewhere between economic classifications (presumptively legitimate) and
racial classifications (presumptively illegitimate). According to the
Court, some biological and social "real differences" between men and
women do exdst; consequently, some legislative classifications that distinguish men and women may be rational.1 Further, women have not
been targeted as a class in the same way as blacks have, and, therefore,
the Court does not as readily presume that gendered classifications
are badly motivated. Unlike racial classifications, gender classifications are not necessarily irrational, and the ends toward which they
aim are not necessarily illegitimate. Thus, the judicial scrutiny that
the Court applies to gender classifications is higher than that which
the Court applies to economic legislation, but not as strict as that
which the Court applies to racial classifications. While the Court has
struck down some gender-based statutes,3 it has upheld more than a
few.
see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944) (strict scrutiny applied, but act
upheld as not constituting invidious racial discrimination).
34. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 9-11 (classifications based solely on race have no legitimate
purpose).
35. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981) (gender classification requiring only
men to register for draft, not invidious and not unconstitutional); Michael M. v. Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981) (plurality opinion) (California statute punishing only males for raping
females does not unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of gender).
36. This insight explains the Court's uncertainty over whether gender-based discriminations
hurt or help women, or discriminate against men rather than women. See, e.g., Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam) (more lenient formula to calculate social security
benefits for women than men); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1977) (plurality
opinion); id. at 217-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (gender-based difference between
widow and widowers for social security benefits).
37. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
38. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 480 U.S. 313 (1977); Schesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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Finally, as the Court held in Washington v. Davis,39 legislation
that does not facially discriminate between men and women or whites
and blacks, but nevertheless adversely affects the interests of persons
in those classes, is not, for that reason alone, unconstitutional.40
Rather, facially neutral legislation is unconstitutional only if the lawmaking body intended its adverse impact.41 This "intent" requirement
with respect to fourteenth amendment challenges to race-neutral or
gender-neutral legislation also can be derived from the Court's general
commitment to rationality as the goal of equal protection and irrationality as the targeted evil. Under the rationality model, a general rule
applied to all equally will not be found irrational because the burden
of the rule falls more heavily upon one group than upon another.
Instead, a rule is irrational only if the rule treats similarly situated
groups differently. Such rules will affect adversely some groups because of the differential situation of the burdened groups: the rule
treats differently situated groups similarly rather than similarly
situated groups differently. However, if irrationality means the differential treatment of similar groups, then even-handed treatment of
different groups, regardless of its impact, is neither rational nor irrational, but simply different. Furthermore, no obvious reason compels
doubt of the authors' motives of such race-neutral or gender-neutral
legislation or the legitimacy of the ends the offending legislation purportedly serves. Thus, the Washington v. Davis holding could be restated in this way: legislation that adversely injures blacks or women,
but does so in spite of its facial evenhandedness, violates neither
notions of "logical rationality" (that likes be treated alike) nor norms
of "ethical rationality" (that legislation be nonmalicious in its origin
and general in its societal impact). Therefore, for such legislation to
violate fourteenth amendment norms, the challenger must show a
specific legislative intent to harm. Absent a showing of specific intent,
the Court will uphold a facially neutral statute as constitutional.
B.

The Attack on Formal Equality and the Rationality Model

The central judicial presumption of the rationality model, that racial
classifications always are irrational and that gender classifications usually are irrational, rests on a theory of equality grounded in a universalist vision of our shared human nature. That vision is unquestionably
noble and appealing in its aspiration. Its guiding assumption is that

39.
40.
41.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
See id. at 239, 242.
See id. at 239-41.
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all persons - women, men, blacks, and whites - are more or less the
same with respect to the traits and issues that affect or should affect
political decisionmaking. 42 Women as well as men, and blacks as well
as whites, wish to lead and can lead meaningful lives ennobled by
participation in the shared, political life of the public sphere, enriched
by fairly compensated and intrinsically rewarding work in the private
sphere, and enlivened by stimulating, nurturant relationships in the
intimate sphere. Blacks no less than whites, and women no less than
men, benefit from the liberal arts and educational opportunities
deepening intellectual adult life. Blacks and women, like whites and
men, need and value opportunities to develop athletic potential. Many
women, like many men, treasure and pursue the opportunity to enlist
in the country's armed services and willingly devote their lives to
strengthen the country's defense capabilities against outside aggression. Women, like men, and blacks, like whites, can be competent and
fair jurors, estate executors, lawyers, and doctors. The list could be
extended endlessly. Legislation that classifies on the basis of gender
or race and that burdens women's or blacks' political, economic, athletic, or educational opportunities in any sphere in which women and
men and blacks and whites are similarly situated is irrational, and
hence, unconstitutional. The universalist vision promotes this formal
or legal ideal of equality and provides the basis for the rationality
interpretation of the equal protection clause. In all areas of life in
which blacks and whites and women and men are the same, the legislator must treat them as the same.
During the 1980s feminist legal theorists registered increasing dissatisfaction with the rationalist model of equal protection, the formal
or legal vision of equality toward which it aspires, and the universalist
conception of human nature in which it is rooted. 43 Such feminist dissatisfaction with formal equality stems not so much from a suspicion
that the Court's practice cannot live up to the promise of equal treatment, but from the nature of the promise itself. Formal equality across-the-board equal treatment of women and men - would have

42.

The vision is also, in some of its forms, unquestionably feminist. For a strong defense

and explication of the virtues of the model from a feminist point of view, see Williams, Notes
from a First Generation, 1989 Cim. LEGAL F. 99.

43. In a recent article capturing both the spirit and the content of this critique, Professor
Mary Becker provocatively dubbed the promise of formal equality inherent in the rationality
model "Prince Charming." See Becker, Prince Charming:Abstract Equality, 1989 SuP. CT.

REv. 201 (arguing that formal equality would not help and often would hurt women's actual
well-being).
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only a limited effect on women's lives for two basic reasons. First,
women and men are not similar, the universalist premises of the rationality model notwithstanding. To summarize a great deal of recent
feminist writings: women have different perceptions and experiences
of the social world," different understandings or moral obligations, 45
different perspectives of the biological role in reproduction, 6 different
ways of assimilating knowledge, 47 different feelings toward housework
and childraising,- different vulnerabilities toward different potential
harms,' 9 different life -patterns,- and a radically different history.51
Insistence upon the "sameness" of men and women in the face of
undeniable differences between them and social subordination of
women by men enshrines male attributes as the "norm" and denies
the existence and value of female attributes, pursuits, and ways of
life.52 Any constitutional standard based on the theory that men and
women are the same will benefit only those women least in need of
the law's protection - women, such as the "professional women" of
the 1980s, who already are most like men.- Formal equality will ignore
or even hurt those women "least" like men: traditional homemakers
and women trapped in low-paying and gender-segregated jobs.- Finally, formal equality is irrelevant to all women in those spheres of
our lives in which we are most clearly unlike men: our more marked
vulnerability to sexual assault, our greater involvement in childraising
and housework, and our different role in the reproductive process.
The rationality model fails because it rests on a false assumption of
sameness and aspires toward a goal of similar treatment that will help
only marginally a few already-privileged women. Its consequence will
be not true equality but further harm to most women.44. See Fineman, Challenging Law, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25 (1990); West, The Difference
in Women's Hedonic Lives, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
45. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
46. S. FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION
(1970).
47. M. BELENKY, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE,
AND MIND (1986).
48.

A. HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION

AT HOME (1989).

49. West, supra note 44.
50. T. OLSEN, SILENCES (1978).
51. Id.
52. See generally Littleton, Women's Experience, 1989 CHI. LEGAL F. 23; Note, Toward
a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487, 499 (1981).
53. See generally C. MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 215-34 (critique of formal equality).
54. See generally Becker, supra note 43 (critique of formal equality).
55. See generally id.
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This "sameness-difference" problem with the dominant rationality
model has prompted several feminists, notably Christine Littleton, to
6
advocate a modification or reform of the rationality doctrine itself.
Littleton has argued that equality should mean not just treating groups
the same when they are the same, but also treating them differently
when they are different, and doing so in such a way as to ensure a
rough equality of outcomes. 57 Under this modified view of the rationality model of equality, which Littleton calls the equal acceptance
model, the equal protection clause requires legislators to be "equally
accepting" of men and women5 If women are the same as men in
certain aspects, they should be treated similarly. But in aspects in
which women and men differ, the law should be as equally responsive
to men's and women's differing characteristics, attributes, needs, values, vulnerabilities, and aspirations. The impulse behind the "acceptance" picture of equality is strikingly feminist: the acceptance model
requires legislators not only to treat like groups alike, but also to
refrain from inscribing the imprimatur of "normalcy" upon male attributes, characteristics, preferences, and modes of life.
Other feminists, notably Catharine MacKinnon, Ruth Colker, and
Mary Becker, 59 argue that the rationality model had a second and
deeper problem that Littleton's reform, although well-meaning and
even welcome, failed to address. The larger problem with the rationality model is not just that women are different from men in ways
which formal equality ignores, but that formal equality itself, whether
or not modified by Littleton's "acceptance" amendment, targets the
wrong evil.60 Irrationality, or treating like groups differently, should
not be the target of the equal protection clause, nor should rationality,
treating like groups alike, be regarded as its goal. Rather, antisubordinationists argue that the social subordination of some groups by
others (women by men and blacks by whites) is the target of the equal
protection clause. Hence, only substantive equality between these
groups, or the end of social subordination, is its goal.61 The rationality
model fails to target the social, economic, and political differences that
account for women's subordinate status. A constitutional mandate that
legislation must presume a sameness between men and women in the

56.
57.

See Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987).
Id. at 1296-97.

58.

Id.

59. C. MACKINNON, supra note 20; Becker, supra note 43; Colker, Antisubordination
Above All Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986).
60. See Colker, supra note 59, at 1007-16.
61. Id.
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face of massive inequality will be simply irrelevant to the true causes
and nature of women's inequality or will backfire and harm rather
than help women. Professor Becker explained the consequences of
formal equality:
Formal equality... can effect only limited change. It cannot,
for example, ensure that jobs are structured so that female
workers and male workers are equally able to combine wage
work and parenthood. Nor can it ensure that social security,
unemployment compensation, and other safety nets are
structured so as to provide for women's financial security as
well as they provide for men's. Moreover, women, especially
ordinary mothers and wives, have been harmed by the
changes effected to date by the movement towards formal
equality. Further movement in that direction could bring
additional harm. Any other satisfactory and workable general
standard to be applied by judges is as yet unimagined and
likely to be so for the foreseeable future.6
C.

Alternative Understandingsof Equal Protection:
Antisubordination and Pure Protection

The critiques of the rationality model summarized above have given
rise to a second, and dissident, understanding of the mandate of equal
protection. Catharine MacKinnon has delineated this second understanding with great force and eloquence in her writings. Often called
the antisubordination model of equal protection, this view perceives
the equality that equal protection guarantees as substantive, not formal. Hence, the test of legislation under the equal protection clause
is not whether the legislative classification "fits" a pre-existing reality,
but rather whether the classification furthers the subordination of
women vis-4-vis men or attempts to end that subordination. MacKinnon explained the antisubordination model:
[The] only question for litigation is whether the policy or
practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance
of an underclass or a deprived position because of gender
status. This disadvantage which constitutes the injury of
discrimination is not the failure to be treated "without regard
to" one's sex; that is the injury of arbitrary differentiation.

62. Becker, supra note 43, at 247.
63. See generally C. MAcKINNON, supra note 20, at 215-37 (development of antisubordination theory of equality).
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The unfairness lies in being deprived because of being a
woman or a man, a deprivation given meaning in the social
context of the dominance or preference of one sex over the
other. 64
The antisubordination model, then, aspires not to formal equality,
but to substantive equality. The goal is not a world in which state
legislators treat men and women 'the same," but rather a world in
which men and women, whether the same or different, are social
equals. The antisubordination model envisions a world in which women
are no more vulnerable to asault than men are, no less valued than
men are, no more underpaid than men are, no less cared for than men
are, no less represented than men are, and no less participatory in
the public sphere than men are. In sharp contrast to the rationality
model, the antisubordination model rests not on a universalist vision
of our "shared" human nature, but on a political vision of our present
unequal social reality. 6s For constitutional purposes, the relevant issue
is decidedly not that women are 'the same" as men but are treated
differently or that women are different from men and are treated the
same. The relevant issue is that women are subordinate to men in
the public social, economic, private, and intimate spheres. Thus, the
aim of the equal protection clause should be to highlight and rectify
that political reality and not to highlight and mirror similarities or
differences between men and women. Legislation that promotes or
encourages social equality is constitutional, but that which promotes
or encourages social subordination is unconstitutional. 66
64.

C. MACKINNON, SExuAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN

117 (1979).

65. See generally C. MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 215-37 (development of antisubordination theory of equality).
66. The antisubordination model has much to commend it, not only to women's progress,
but also as a constitutional rule. It is the essence of simplicity. Doctrine developed under this
model would not bear the burdens of two-tiered review, suspect class analysis, the real difference
doctrine, and the intent requirement. As Professor MacKinnon noted, 'the only question for litigation" is whether the statute subordinates women, or challenges that subordination. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 64, at 117 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 64.
The antisubordination model of equal protection, however, also is riddled with problems, many
of them pragmatic. Most importantly, because of its simplicity, the antisubordination model
could be extremely difficult to apply to particular cases: it is much easier to state the standard
than to ascertain whether a particular piece of legislation has met the standard. Feminist scholar
and lawyer Sylvia Law explains:
Professor MacKinnon's approach is ambitious, but it adds unnecessary complexity
to the application of sex equality doctrine in a large number of cases. The determination of what reinforces or undermines a sex-based underclass is exceedingly
difficult. Professor MacKinnon may overestimate judges' capacities to identify and
avoid socially imposed constraints on equality. She disregards our history in which
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A third possible understanding of equal protection that has received
relatively little attention in either feminist commentary or cases, but
which may be closer to the plain meaning, intent, and history of the
clause than either the rationality or the antisubordination models, is
what I call the pure protection model. To deny equal protection might
mean that a state refuses to grant to some citizens the protection
against private wrongdoing that it grants to others. For example, a
state's refusal to protect black citizens from homicidal attacks by
whites or a state's passivity in the face of widespread lynching and
private violence would constitute a paradigmatic violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. Similarly, as Justice Bradley suggested in The Civil Rights Cases,67 a southern state's
refusal to grant a common law cause of action to black travelers to
protect them against southern white innkeepers' refusals of service
would constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. 8
In this century, for northern as well as southern municipalities to
provide less-than-adequate police protection against violent crime in
poorer parts of a city might constitute a denial of the equal protection
of the law under the pure protection model. Likewise, for a municipality to employ an all-white police force hostile to the concerns, fears,
and interests of black neighborhoods might constitute an equal protection violation. Therefore, under the pure protection model, no less
than under the antisubordination model, Washington v. Davis is clearly
wrong. The pure protection model views the target of the equal protection clause as the denial of the state's protection to some of its
citizens from private violence, aggression, and wrongdoing. The goal
is a community in which all are equally protected by the state against
private encroachment of rights.
One way to describe the vision behind this pure protection model
of equal protection, and to a lesser extent behind the antisubordination
model, is in terms of state sovereignty. The pure protection model
envisions a world in which the state is the sole, legitimate repositor

laws justified as protecting women have been a central means of oppressing them.
Most fundamentally, her proposed standard may incorporate and perpetuate a false
belief that a judicially enforced constitutional standard can, by itself, dismantle the
deep structures that "integrally contribute" to sex-based deprivation.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. Rxv. 955, 1005 (1984).
Even accepting Professor Law's criticism, the major problem with the model is somewhat
simpler: for whatever reasons, antisubordination approaches to equal protection, regarding sex
or race, have not met with judicial acceptance.
67. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
68. Id. at 25.
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of organized force exercised by some individuals against others. The
equal protection clause would not tolerate the existence of separate
"regimes" of sovereignty, backed by unchecked and private systems
of organized violence. The pure protection model requires that we live
under only one sovereign - the state. The white race cannot constitute
a separate sphere of sovereignty over the black race, nor can men
constitute a separate sovereignty over women. Only the state has the
power to exercise dominion; through the use of organized violence,
over its citizens. Any other exercise of violence and power by one
group of citizens over another is criminal, and the state is constitutionally obligated to guard its citizens against such domination.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION

Predictably, most of the scholarly commentary and virtually all of
the judicial opinions that have addressed the constitutionality of marital rape exemptions have analyzed the constitutionality of marital
rape exemptions under the rationality model of equality and equal
protection.6 9 The commentary and opinions illustrate not only the
strength and sensibility of the rationality model, but also the problems
and limits of its formal vision of equality, its universalist vision of
human nature, and its doctrinal tests of "rationality." These arguments
take several different forms, depending on whether the law under
scrutiny is gender-specific (exempts wives from rape laws) or genderneutral (exempts "spouses"). A summary of these arguments follows.
First, some states employ marital rape exemptions that are
explicitly gendered: rape is defined as nonconsensual intercourse with
a woman other than one's wife. 0 The two-step argument that these
gender-specific statutes are unconstitutional is straightforward. First,
such gender-specific statutes explicitly legislate on the basis of either
gender alone or gender plus marital status. Either classification constitutes a suspect class giving rise to at least the mid-level scrutiny. 71
As the Court has noted on multiple occasions, women have been the
objects of stereotypical and stultifying thinking that has seriously compromised their enjoyment of and participation in the public world.2

69. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Note, To Have and To Hold, supranote 2, at 1259-60, 1267-70 (discussing
gender-based marital rape exemption statutes and citing states that currently have such statutes
in force).
71. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
72. See supra note 37.
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For that reason alone, legislation that treats women differently from
men deserves heightened scrutiny.3 Furthermore, although the Court
never has held as much, historically oppressive treatment renders
married women a suspect class. In American and English common
law heritage, the law did not acknowledge a married woman's existence.7 4 Thus, a law that burdens either women or married women,
and marital rape exemptions can do both, should be subject to
heightened scrutiny.
Second, under a heightened scrutiny, if the gender-specific legislation is to be sustained, the state must articulate an "important governmental interest" which is "substantially related" to the statutory
classification.7 This articulation, the argument proceeds, a state cannot
possibly do. Proponents of the marital rape exemption typically assert
that the state's important interest in promoting marital harmony and
intimacy, or, alternatively, its interest in encouraging reconciliation
of warring spouses, justifies the statute.7 Yet, the state undeniably
has little or no legitimate interest in protecting the harmony or intimacy of a marriage deteriorated to the point of violent sexual abuse,
and it has equally as little interest in encouraging the reconciliation
of spouses whose relations no longer are consensual, much less harmonious.7 Thus, because these statutory classifications are not "substantially related" to an important governmental interest, gender-specific marital exemption laws are unconstitutional.
On the other hand, marital exemptions that define rape as nonconsensual sex with anyone except one's spouse, rather than nonconsensual sex with anyone except one's wife, are gender neutral. While
these statutes avoid the heightened scrutiny triggered by genderexplicit classifications, they nevertheless also are unconstitutional
under traditional rationality standards. A gender-neutral classification
that adversely impacts upon women and appears to be motivated by
an intention to hurt women is as unconstitutional as is a sex-specific
classification. 8 Marital rape exemptions are strikingly easy to trace
to misogynist roots, from Hale's infamous argument that a married
woman is presumed to consent to all marital sex and, therefore, cannot

73. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
74. See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 2, at 1256-58.
75. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
76. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
77. See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (1984).
78. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (discussing neutral classifications
and adverse impacts in a Title VII racial discrimination context).
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be raped,79 to the common law's assumption that marriage results in
the unification of husband and wife and that marital rape thus constitutes rape of oneself, a legal impossibility2o Whether cleansed through
the filter of sex-neutral language or not, the marital rape exemption
clearly is rooted in an intention to deprive the married woman of the
protection of the state and to subject her to the will, sovereignty, and
unchecked violence of her spouse. Because this intention serves no
"important governmental interest," gender-neutral marital rape
exemptions are unconstitutional as well.
Furthermore, whether gender-specific or gender-neutral, marital
rape exemptions create a host of irrational distinctions that underscore
their unconstitutionality: between married couples and unmarried
couples who cohabitate; between married, but estranged partners still
living together and married partners living apart (who often are not
included in the scope of the exemption); between partners who have
filed for divorce and those who have not; and between partners who
have indicated their intentions to end the marital union and those who
have not. 81 Apart from the effects of the marital rape exemption on
women, and even granting the importance of the state's interest in
protecting marital harmony, these distinctions are irrational. What
rational, legitimate state goal could possibly justify the lines drawn
between these groups?
Paradoxically, perhaps the strongest traditional, rationality-based
argument against marital rape exemptions has not appeared in case
law. This argument asserts that these statutes create an irrational
distinction between married women and all other persons and that
this distinction is not justified by real differences between those two
groups. The classification and differential treatment of married women
rests on the assumption that married women, unlike all other persons,
have no interest in receiving protection from the state against violent
and sexual assault. But, married women, exactly like men and unmarried women, clearly need physical security in their private spheres.
Just as all human beings without the security and dignity of knowing
that the state ensures their protection, women cannot lead autonomous, meaningful, and pleasurable lives. Married women need to know
that sexual assault against them is criminal and punishable when committed by their husbands. For that matter, they need to know that
sexual assault is as criminal when committed against them as would
79. M. HALE,
CROWN 636 (1736).
80.

HISTORIA PLACTORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE

For a good discussion of the history of the exemption, see Note, To Have and To Hold,

supra note 2, at 1255-58.
81. Id. at 1259-60.
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be any intrafamilial crime of violence. The irrational distinction of the
marital rape exemption is between the protected needs and rights of
the average citizen to be safe from criminal assault and the unprotected
same needs and rights of married women. The creation of a class of
citizens subject to legalized violence is the core effect, if not the purpose, of the marital rape exemption. Surely, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection must guard against that effect.
Marital rape exemptions, then, are arguably unconstitutional, even
under the traditional rationality model of equal protection, for reasons
that are at the heart of that model's utopian vision. We do indeed
share a common humanity, part of which is to need protection against
private violence. Women are as much in need of that protection as
are men. Like men, without that protection women are rendered vulnerable to the whim, will, sovereignty, instincts, fiat, and command
of those who are stronger. And, like men, when women are rendered
weak, they become incapable of living the kinds of lives the ideal
liberal state is surely meant to foster: autonomous, pleasurable, productive, civic, and educated. When state passivity renders women
vulnerable to private violence, women, like men, become stunted,
fearful, self-alienated, childlike, and servile. Women are no more naturally suited to such servility and dominance than are their brothers,
fathers, sons, and husbands.
All of these arguments, however, pose serious doctrinal problems.
These problems reflect the inadequacies of the rationality model of
equal protection and formal equality that have troubled feminists
throughout the 1980s. Simply stated, for each argument catalogued
above, a fairly obvious legal rejoinder is available, which is equally,
if not better, grounded in modern equal protection doctrine. I am not
using a linguistic quirk or playing a lawyer's game. My point is not
the familiar indeterminacy claim that any legal argument gives rise
to an equally credible rejoinder. Rather, the doctrinal and legal bases
for the legal rejoinders rest on the fundamental, political reality of
women's lives - the irreducible fact of women's subordination to men
through unchecked sexual violence. The universalist vision and formal
equality aspirations of the rationality model of equal protection simply
fail to address this reality. Thus, the very existence and viability of
these rejoinders evidence the limits and dangers of current understandings of the equal protection clause.
First, the argument for the unconstitutionality of gender-specific
rape exemptions summarized above is anything but airtight. As noted
earlier, in contrast to the impossible requirement of a compelling state
interest required to sustain racially explicit legislation," gender-spe82.

See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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cific legislation is constitutional if the state can articulate an "important
governmental objective" substantially furthered by the gendered classification. Nothing prohibits a court from determining that protection
of marital privacy, insularity, and harmony is such an important state
interest that protection of the husband against criminal charges of
rape substantially furthers that interest. 4 The political reality that
the availability of this legal rejoinder reflects is that, to the
mainstream, the very sphere of private subordination that harms
women and concerns feminists appears to be not only a legitimate,
but also an important or even compelling state interest. This political
reality also reflects a deeper social reality. The obstacles to women's
equal participation in public life and enjoyment of private life are so
thoroughly ingrained in our societal habits, institutions, and thought
patterns that they appear not as obstacles to equality, but as the
essence of private life. Surely, protecting the allure of romance, the
domain of sentiment, and the pleasures of intimacy is a compelling
state interest. The bottom line is that the same reality experienced
by the raped wife as a daily ritual of violence, abuse, and horror
strikes the feminist as unconscionable state passivity in the face of
private subordination and strikes the feminist lawyer as the denial of
equal protection. But it conceivably appears to the Court as a important" or "compelling" state interest in marital privacy, marital harmony, and spousal reconciliation.
The argument for the unconstitutionality of gender-neutral marital
rape exemptions also rests on shaky ground. 5 The legal uncertainty
reflects not the uncertainty or indeterminacy of legal arguments generally, but rather societal ambivalence towards women's equality. Gender-neutral marital rape exemptions undoubtedly are the product of
a history of discriminatory attitudes toward women.8 Nevertheless,
a court conceivably could decide that, ancient history notwithstanding,
a statute recently cleansed of gender-specific language is freed of its
misogynist heritage and that its recent legislative history provides
the sole source of its constitutionality. Surely one could argue that
gender-neutral marital rape exemptions, similar to the one in the

83. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
84. Indeed, the "privacy" cases under the substantive due process doctrine, including Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), itself, seems to bolster such an argument. See generally Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer

v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
85.
86.

See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 2, at 1267.
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Model Penal Code8 7 endorsed in this decade, rest not on a desire to
harm women, but on a desire to protect the institution of marriage.
As is evidenced by this theory, the presumption that the genderneutral marital rape exemptions are constitutional because they respect the sameness of men and women ignores the very real differences
between husbands and wives. Women and men are very differently
situated within marriage. Overwhelmingly, husbands are larger,
stronger, and wealthier than wives. A gender-neutral statute that
treats spouses similarly by according them the same immunities from
rape prosecution and 'hence the same vulnerability to marital rape
ignores these crucial differences and perpetuates the marital subordination of women. As many feminists suggest, in the light of the societal
differences between women and men, the presumption of fairness and
constitutionality on universalist grounds typically accorded genderneutral statutes may be generally unwarranted.8 In the case of marital

rape exemptions, however, the presumption of sameness in the face
of life-threatening differences looks not only unwarranted but also
grotesque.
Most importantly, the arguable constitutionality of all marital rape
exemptions, both gender-specific and gender-neutral, vividly
exemplifies the antisubordinationist reservations about the rationality
model of equal protection. The rationality arguments that underlie
traditional equal protection analysis not only are doctrinally unstable,
they also overlook the terrifying injustice of these statutes - for
precisely the reasons MacKinnon's, Becker's, and Colker's critiques
of formal equality suggest. Indeed, the virtue of rationality and the
vice of irrationality is worse than irrelevant to the real injustice of
these exemptions. After all, rationality problems with these statutes
can and sometimes have been cured by extending rather than eliminating the scope of the exception. If married couples and cohabitants
cannot rationally be treated differently, the marital rape exemption
should be extended to include cohabitants.89 By the same perverse
logic, if married women and unmarried women cannot rationally be
treated differently, rape law should be eliminated altogether. At the
extreme, if married women and all other persons cannot rationally be
treated differently, the criminal sanction should be eliminated. Presumably, these arguments would and should fail, but a model of equal
protection that implies their coherence is profoundly wrong.

87.

MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.0, .6 (1989).

88.
89.

See supra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 11.
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The irrationality of marital rape exemptions is not their fundamental flaw. The evil flaw of these exemptions is not that they irrationally
treat married couples differently from cohabitants, or married women
differently from unmarried women, or husbands differently from
rapists unacquainted with their victims, or women differently from
men. The evil is that they legalize, and hence legitimate, a form of
violence that does inestimable damage to all women, not only to those
who are raped. In addition to the obvious violence, brutality, and
terror marital rape exemptions facilitate, marital rape exemptions,
like the rapes they legalize, also sever the central connection to selfhood that links a woman's pleasure with her desires, will, and actions.9
The will of the married woman who learns to accept routinized rape
is no longer ruled by or even connected to her desires. Eventually,
her desires are no longer a product of what she enjoys or what she
has learned to enjoy. What the victim of routinized rape within marriage does, sexually, is a product not of what the victim wills but of
what her attacker demands. As an immediate consequence, her will
becomes a function not of her desires but of his desires. Eventually
her desires become a function not of her pleasures, but of his pleasures;
she wants literally to please him rather than herself because to please
herself is too dangerous. The victim of marital rape gains survival,
but she sacrifices self-sovereignty. In other words, she sacrifices the
ability to control her own will and to determine her own actions,
pleasures, and desires free from external influence. In short, she sacrifices selfhood. 91
To call the damage occasioned by statutes protecting this direct
subordination of self to the necessity of survival an irrationality simply
is wrong. The damage occasioned by these statutes is the subordination, and in many cases the annihilation, of the psychic, physical,
emotional, and erotic female self. Under a rationality model this clear
fact entirely escapes constitutional notice. The exemption is constitutional if rational and unconstitutional if irrational. Surely, the state
acts irrationally when it complies with this profoundly personal, violent
subordination. The determination of rationality depends on the Court's
assessment of the importance of the state's goals. If the state wants
to pursue the goal of marital privacy, harmony, and spousal reconciliation at the cost of female self-sovereignty, and if the Court decides
that the goal of marital privacy is important (which surely it could),

90. See generally D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1983) (describing effects of marital
rape exemptions); West, supra note 44.

91. See generally West, supra note 44.
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then the marital rape exemption is an imminently rational, hence constitutional, way to achieve this goal. But, whether the law is rational
or irrational, the state's complicity in this pervasive regime of private
domestic violence is clearly unequal. It denies married women, in the
most literal sense, the protection of its laws. The rationality model of
equal protection quite dramatically fails to target the state's complicity
in this subordinating annihilation of married women's selfhood.
In contrast, both the evil and the inequality perpetuated by marital
rape exemptions become strildngly apparent under either the dissident
antisubordination or historical pure protection model of equal protection. Under the antisubordination model a state action violates the
fourteenth amendment guarantee if the state complies with the subordination of women by men.- Without question, marital rape exemptions do precisely that. The antisubordination model locates the target
of the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantee, not in the
irrationality of a state's legislative scheme, but in a state's complicity
in private or social subordination. When the state encourages or permits a significant increase in the illegitimate power of one social group
over another, the state defies the safeguards of the equal protection
clause. The marital rape exemption is an instance of state complicity
in men's subordination of women through routinized violent sexual
assault and the threat of violent assault. Each assault spurs self-denial,
self-abnegation, and self-diminution for women and furthers political
ratification of women's psychological and psychic subservience. Each
assault constitutes a political act of subordination. Under the antisubordination model even state complicity, not to mention explicit state
endorsement, in this private subordination clearly is unconstitutional.
Similarly, the pure protection model highlights the unconstitutionality of these statutes rather than obscures it. This model recognizes
that the fourteenth amendment ensures that all citizens equally enjoy
the basic terms of the social contract, that the state protects all from
private assault, that the state protects all from their own vulnerability,
that the state recognizes the equality of all citizens under law, and
that the state assures that they live under no separate sovereign
authority.9 Only with such protection may persons construct the public, productive, responsible, autonomous lives that the liberal state
and its rule of law ideal envisions. A marital rape exemption, regardless of its intent, its history, or its purported state purpose, creates

92.
93.

See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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precisely the insulated, separate sphere of sovereignty that the pure
protection view of the equal protection clause forbids. With the exemption in place, a marriage becomes not a nurturant, safe haven offering
shelter from the storm, but a separate political world in which the
husband is sovereign and the wife subject. Moreover, her vulnerability
to this organized, dehumanizing, and alienating violence is fully legitimated by the state under which she lives. Sexual force and violence
within marriage is unleashed and legalized, and legalized force and
violence, of course, is the precondition of political power. A marriage
thus becomes a separate state of sovereignty. The marital rape exemption creates, fosters, and encourages not marital intimacy, harmony,
or reconciliation, but a separate state of sovereignty ungoverned by
law and insulated from state interference. Whatever other "legitimate"
goals the state may thereby further, such a separate political order,
under a pure protection model, precisely is what the fourteenth amendment forbids the states to tolerate.
IV.

RATIONALITY, ANTISUBORDINATION, AND

EQUAL PROTECTION:
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

In summary, equal protection lends itself to three different interpretations: (1) a rationality model, which targets legislative classifications that are irrational or irrelevant to legitimate state goals; (2)
an antisubordination model, which targets legislation that substantively contributes to the subordination of one group by another, and
(3) a pure protection model, which targets a state's failure to grant
protection of its law to all citizens equally, thus failing to ensure that
all citizens are subject equally to one and only one sovereign, namely
the sovereignty of the rule of law. Marital rape exemptions are unconstitutional under all of these approaches. However, the argument for
that conclusion under the rationality model is weak, and it obscures,
rather than highlights, the most unjust features of marital rape exemptions. The antisubordination and pure protection interpretations of the
equal protection clause, by contrast, precisely highlight the most offensive features of marital rape exemptions - not the irrationality of
marital rape exemptions, but their legitimation of a regime of private
force and organized violence that creates and encourages the male
subordination of women and the insulation of a separate and sovereign
political regime through which that subordination is effectuated.
These three models, however, do not stand on equal footing. The
rationality model, which has without question been a mixed blessing
for women, is dominant black letter law in the area of gender classifi-
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cations, and the Court does not seem inclined to change that fact.9
The antisubordination model of equal protection, although arguably
closer to the Warren Court's understanding of the phrase, 95 has played
virtually no role in the development of equal protection doctrine over
the last twenty years and only an ambiguous role during the prior
twenty years. The pure protection model has not influenced equal
protection doctrine for over one hundred years. Its last judicial
acknowledgement may have been in Justice Bradley's decision in 1883
in The Civil Rights Cases.9 Consequently, both the antisubordination
model and the pure protection model are only of limited utility. The
antisubordination model aids in understanding the ambiguities and
tensions in the discrimination law of the 1950s and 1960s, when it
commanded some respect from the Warren Court.Y The pure protection model provides some insight concerning the original intent of the
framers of the equal protection clause. For modern purposes, however,
these models clearly are dissident interpretive views. They represent
what the Court could, but does not, read the equal protection clause
to require.
Two questions arise. First, why has the modern Court accepted a
rationality model of equal protection and rejected the other two alternatives? Second, assuming continuing judicial recalcitrance, can the
alternative interpretations of the clause prevail? The answer to the
first question may be that the Court may have accepted the rationality
model of equal protection because only that model creates the standard, legalistic issues that courts are well suited and accustomed to
answering on a practical, jurisprudential level. If this assertion is
correct, then the second question answers itself. However, if the Court
has settled on a rationality model simply because it facilitates judicial
analysis, then other branches of government, notably Congress, may
be open themselves to antisubordination and pure protection interpretations of their fourteenth amendment obligations.

94. For the Court's most recent affirmation of its adherence to a rationality model, and
rejection of an antisubordination model, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989).
95. For a general discussion of the transformation in American constitutional law from a
"liberal legalist" to a conservative paradigm, see West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 641 (1990).
96. See 109 U.S. at 25.
97. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 489 (1954). For a general argument to
the effect that Brown and its progeny should best be understood as within an antisubordination
framework, see Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CH. L. REV.
935 (1989).
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In determining the Court's reason for accepting the rationality
model, remember that the Court itself typically insists, in the course
of rejecting antisubordinationist arguments, that its reasons for doing
so are in large part pragmatic. For example, in Washington v. Davis,
the most unequivocal rejection of the antisubordinationist model, the
Court noted that adoption of such an interpretation of equal protection
would invalidate a wide range of regulatory, social, and economic
legislation that affects the average black more than it affects the
average white. 98 And so it would. By so ruling, the Court clearly
implied that, rightly or wrongly, it is unwilling to undertake such an
intrusive restructuring of federal and state law. This unwillingness
stems not from legal or moral principles, but from pragmatism. The
Court itself insists that it simply cannot fulfill the antisubordinationist
mandate, given its judicial identity.
Jurisprudential reasons may draw the Court to a rationality model
of equal protection analysis. The rationality model requires state legislators and lawmakers to 'treat like groups alike" and requires Courts
to see that they do so. Any legislative classification, then, must be
based upon a difference between the groups that is relevant to a
legitimate state interest. 9 The Court's responsibility under the equal
protection clause is to police against legislative infringement of this
principle. Feminist and progressive antisubordinationist theorists,
however, have identified a major defect in this interpretation: it does
not challenge or change socially created inequalities between classes,
genders, or races. 10° Despite this flaw, the model has an important
virtue from a judicial perspective: it limits the Court's role to the
familiar one of ensuring legal justice. To do justice, a Court must
treat like cases alike. For the most part, appellate courts, including
the Supreme Court, simply police against lower court infractions of
this principle. The rationality model simply imposes an equivalent duty
on legislators. Thus, while judges must treat like cases alike, legislators, who deal with groups instead of cases, also must treat like
groups alike. The Court's duty under the equal protection clause, then,
is to ensure that the legislature metes out equal justice to the groups
before it, just as the Court's appellate function is to ensure that lower
courts mete out equal justice to the individuals who appear before
them. The rationality model of equal protection may be the only model

98. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-48 (1976).
99. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
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that so neatly dovetails with the most traditional, and even classical,
view of judicial functions and domain.11
By construing the equal protection clause as a source of "law" to
be applied by Courts, the general legal culture may have to a considerable degree determined its meaning, not only because we have rendered it subject to the Court's own sense of the pragmatic limits of
its powers, but also because of the nature of law. As long as courts
interpret and enforce the equal protection clause, it should not be
surprising that they interpret the clause as requiring "legal justice,"
or like groups must be treated alike, rather than distributive or even
compensatory justice. 'There is no reason to think that the Supreme
Court is not fully confident of its ability to oversee the quality of
formal, legal justice dispensed by lower courts: that is the Court's
traditional, appellate function. The rationality model of the fourteenth
amendment extends the obligation of doing legal justice to legislators,
but it makes absolutely no fundamental change in the Court's social
role. In this area as in any other, the Court continues to oversee the
quality of legal justice meted out by other institutional and governmental bodies. Consequently, the ultimate judicial embrace of the rationality model, including the formal understanding of the requirement of
legal justice, the antidiscrimination principle, the intent requirement,
the two-tiered or three-tiered levels of review, and the "real differences" rule in the gender cases, may have been inevitable, regardless
of the political composition of the Court. The Court simply may be
unable and unwilling to sustain, for any length of time, any reading
of equal protection that would be less legalistic and more substantive.
The appropriate question to ask, then, may be not whether the
Court will adopt a more aggressive stance toward equal protection,
but whether nonjudicial enforcement of alternative meanings of the
equal protection clause is possible. The answer we give to that question
depends in large part upon whether we view the Court as the exclu-

101. The subsidiary rules the Court has developed under the rationality model likewise can
be understood as ensuring that equal protection law is rendered susceptible to the most traditional, legalistic, and even classical understandings of the requirements of justice. The intent
requirement for race-neutral and gender-neutral classifications adversely impacting upon the
suspect class most notably has the effect not only of restraining severely the reach of the equal
protection clause, but also of limiting the court to traditional forms of analysis. Intent requirements run throughout the law, including tort, contract, and criminal law. The intent requirement
in adverse impact cases under the fourteenth amendment has the effect of transforming constitutional questions into the most traditional, as well as narrowest, legal inquiry imaginable: who
is guilty of wrong doing, with what mens rea, who was thereby hurt, and by how much?
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sive, as well as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.1 2 That
is, a connection may exist between a pluralistic approach to constitutional meaning and a pluralistic approach to constitutional obligations.
Let me first explain these admittedly awkward labels.
Under a pluralistic rather than unitary conception of constitutional
meanings, a constitutional mandate might have several obligatory
meanings. Under a pluralistic approach to constitutional meaning, the
equal protection clause might require (1) that legislative classifications
treat like groups alike; (2) that legislation not insulate or further the
social subordination of women, blacks, or other suspect classes; and
(3) that states ensure that all citizens enjoy the protection of its laws
against private wrongdoing. In contrast, under a unitary approach a
constitutional phrase will have only one obligatory meaning. While
equal protection might logically mean a range of things, and while its
meaning might change over time, only one meaning at any particular
time will be binding law. To put the question formally, then, the issue
is why have we embraced a unitary approach to constitutional meaning
that has rendered antisubordinationist and pure protection understandings of equality dead letters
One reason may be that if the Court is the exclusive and ultimate
interpreter of constitutional meaning, connotative pluralism is awkward, to say the least. Under a unitary approach to institutional obligation, which identifies the Court as the branch of government obligated to enforce it, the Constitution means that which the Court says
it means and only that which the Court says it means. A unitary
approach to meaning follows practically, if not logically, from a unitary
approach to obligation. If, on the other hand, we expand our conception
of who and what is obligated to ensure equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment, then pluralistic conceptions of equal protection
meaning begin to look plausible. The Court could continue to ensure
that legislation treat like groups alike. However, Congress could ensure that state laws prohibit subordination. Lastly, the executive
branch and Congress jointly could ensure that the state supply the
fundamental benefits and burdens of the social contract to all citizens
equally. The state would provide security against private violence and
wrongdoing in exchange for abidance with the obligations of citizenry
under a rule of law regime.

102. There is no doubt, of course, that the Court is the ultimate interpreter of constitutional
meaning. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (reaffirming that the judiciary is the
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution).
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If we change our constitutional habits and learn to think pluralistically about not only the potential meanings of the fourteenth amendment, but also the potential obligations the amendment imparts on all
three branches of government, then we might recognize a wide range
of governmental actions as instances of constitutional decisionmaking.1° More importantly, though, if we think pluralistically not just
about possible meanings, but also about possible sources of enforcement, an expansive understanding of the equality guaranteed under
the fourteenth amendment might one day become a social reality.
V.

A PROPOSED MARRIED WOMEN'S PRIVACY ACT

Whether or not the United States Supreme Court or state supreme
courts ever rule on the unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions,
Congress has the power, the authority, and arguably the duty, to do
so, under section five of the fourteenth amendment.- Congress could
enact a federal law guaranteeing protection to all women against violent sexual assault. Consistent with rationality requirements, this law
would prohibit irrational discrimination against married women in the
making and enforcement of rape laws. This federal law also would
guarantee, consistent with the antisubordination mandate of the fourteenth amendment, that states would not perpetuate or insulate the
sexualized social, private, or intimate subordination of women by men.
Lastly, consistent with the "protection" mandate of the fourteenth
amendment, it would guarantee that no state would deny to women
protection of the state against private criminality. The political will
may or may not be sufficient to sustain such a bill, but the constitutional authority for it surely exists.
A law of this sort at least would remove the anomaly that, while
the marital rape exemptions strike most concerned lawyers and legal
academicians as spectacularly unconstitutional, under present doctrine,
no clear-cut argument presents itself. Perhaps the main reason for
this lag between consensus, argument, and action is logistic. Given a
court-based system of constitutional adjudication in which courts have
near exclusive responsibility for interpreting and enforcing constitu-

103. Robert Kennedy's decision to send in the National Guard during the desegregation
campaigns in the South, for example, appears to be a paradigm instance of protection-type
executive enforcement of the equal protection guarantee.
104. See U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 5; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650
(1966) (section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation to secure
fourteenth amendment guarantees).
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tional law, cases that properly raise issues of this sort will be extremely'
rare. Thus, when a rape defendant raises the issue of the unconstitutionality of the marital rape exemption - indeed, to the best of my
knowledge, the only scenario to date in which the issue has been
raised - he is likely to be arguing that the state's refusal to extend
the exemption to him, is an unconstitutional denial of his equal protection rights. 10 5 A court could respond to this sort of argument by striking
the exemption in its entirety. 1°6 However, a court faced with this
argument could avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the exemption
by simply rejecting the contention that the failure of the state to
extend the exemption constitutes a denial of equal protection. A suit
for damages under the Civil Rights Act or directly under the fourteenth amendment, the other major vehicles for bringing a constitutional infirmity to a court's attention, also lacks logistical viability. A
court hardly could find any branch or agent of state government liable
for failing to arrest or prosecute when no state statute criminalizing
the conduct exists. State immunity doctrines, of course, would bar an
action against the legislature for failing to criminalize conduct. For
logistic reasons alone, the issue seems ripe for legislative, rather than
judicial, constitutional decisionmaking.
The second reason for urging a congressional rather than judicial
response to the unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions lies in
the fact that Congress may be more willing than the judiciary to
interpret seriously the fourteenth amendment as forbidding marital
rape exemptions. Congress is more likely to view marital rape exemptions as subordinating women and insulating a separate sovereignty
of legitimized force, thereby denying women's rights to equal protection under law. Congress may be more open to these arguments not
only because of its present political composition, but for institutional
and theoretical reasons as well. Unlike the Court, Congress is not
obligated to ensure that legislation rationally map on to pre-existing
real distinctions. Furthermore, at least on occasion, Congress aggressively has sought to dismantle and restructure the social, private, and
even intimate structures that collectively create and mask the hierarchies of daily life. Unlike the Court, Congress does not recoil inevitably
at the prospect of undertaking significant reconstructions of social life.
Indeed, this duty is clearly its business. The fourteenth amendment

105. See supra note 1.
106. The New York Court of Appeals, to its credit, has struck the marital rape exemption
on this ground. See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 219-20
(1984).
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easily can be read as a constitutional norm that directs, guides, and
legitimizes the political and moral direction those reconstructive efforts
should take.
If we think of the fourteenth amendment as a moral and political
guide for reconstructive legislation aimed at eradicating illegitimate
social subordination and private spheres of insulated, violent
sovereignty, marital rape exemptions surely are a sensible place for
Congress to start to fulfill its constitutional obligations. A dismantling
of the private regime of sexual violence against women could affect
socially women's public and private lives as greatly as the dismantling
of private regimes of segregation and institutionalized racism has affected blacks. As was the case with the desegregation campaign, the
legal recognition of a constitutional right to protection against private
sexual violence in the domestic sphere, without more, could change
and expand not only women's rights, privacy, security, and safety,
but also women's senses of self and others' senses of women as fully
participatory, represented, acknowledged, and respected members of
society. Such recognition could help rehabilitate the damage to
women's self-esteem, their feelings of self-possession, and their overall
sense of wholeness. Just as the constitutional assault on desegregation
triggered a change in societal perception of blacks, constitutionally
motivated congressional action ensuring women's rights to be protected against marital rape could trigger wide ranging changes in
societal portrayals and perceptions of women's roles, rights, and public
responsibilities.
Finally, the foundational and permanent recognition of women's
rights to be free from forced marital sex that can come about only
through constitutional decisionmaking may be a prerequisite to further
progress on a range of related issues regarding women's physical and
sexual security. Date rape and acquaintance rape, for example, unlike
marital rape, clearly are criminal, but they may be insulated from
legal prosecution and public condemnation at least in part because of
their shadow resemblance to marital rape, which is still fully protected
in many states and underprosecuted in virtually all. The martial
exemption, in brief, is simply the most brutal of all possible expressions
of the social inclination to trivialize women's interest in physical and
sexual security. Until women have physical and sexual security, both
their public contributions and their private lives will be stunted, not
only by personal fears, but by social and legal inferiority fueled by a
public perception of female personhood perverted by the deep knowledge of women's legal vulnerability. Women will not have that security
until they have established their constitutional right to be equally
protected against laws that encourage their psychic and sexual subor-
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dination and render them subject to private states of separate
sovereignty. Conversely, when the law guarantees women that security, the gains will be immense. All women, married and single, and
all men might learn what it means to live in a truly democratic home,
in a truly nurturant social world, transformed and inspired by a newly
empowered, equally respected feminist community.
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